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Particularly pervasive violent conflicts in the Horn of Africa have detrimental effects on people’s livelihoods there. While the intensity, causes, and reper-
cussions of violent conflicts vary spatially and temporally, pastoral areas are currently the hotspots. This paper examines the causes and consequences 
of violent conflicts in Ethiopia between Afar pastoralists and two of their neighbors, the Issa and the Karrayyu. The findings are based on primary data 
(individual interviews, group discussions, and field observations) and secondary data (documents and publications) collected in 2005 and 2006. The 
results indicate that contemporary challenges such as recurrent droughts, resource appropriation, livestock raiding, proliferation of small arms, and illicit 
trade contribute to the perpetuation of violent conflicts. While traditional institutions manage inter-clan conflicts, their effectiveness is quite limited with 
regard to inter-ethnic conflicts, where the contemporary challenges in pastoral areas are too diverse and complex to be managed solely by traditional 
institutions. The perpetuation of violent conflicts has affected the livelihoods of pastoralists, thereby causing humanitarian crisis and limiting access to 
resources and opportunities.
Conflicts between Afar Pastoralists and their Neighbors: 
Triggers and Motivations
Bekele Hundie, Institute of Public Management and Development Studies,  
Ethiopian Civil Service College, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
1. Introduction
More than a century ago Vilfredo Pareto wrote that “the 
efforts of men are utilized in two different ways: they are 
directed to the production or transformation of economic 
goods, or else to the appropriation of goods produced by 
others” (Pareto ���� ������, ����� � e production or trans�
formation of economic goods requires involvement in 
exchange through peaceful institutions; interacting enti�
ties focus on building harmonious relationships through 
negotiation, mutual respect, and cooperation� On the other 
hand, the appropriation of resources or goods owned by 
others may entail the application of other types of institu�
tions involving coercion arising from antagonism—here 
termed “institutions of violence”� Several theoretical 
analyses show the possibility that institutions of violence 
can coexist with (if not totally replace� peaceful institutions 
(Garfinkel ����; Skaperdas ���2; Hirshleifer ��88�� Skaper�
das’s analysis indicates a narrow range for full cooperation, 
and implies that in the context of insecure property rights 
actors are most likely to prefer coercive means� Likewise, 
Hirshleifer develops a model to explain the situation of con�
tinuing conflict that implies that competing groups always 
find it advantageous to allot at least some of their resources 
to conflict technology� Hence, “total peace” is less likely 
when coercion is one possible means to control resources�
Existing evidence corroborates these theoretical studies� 
Despite normative arguments in favor of peace, conflicts 
occur everywhere in the world� Even today, more than eight 
hundred thousand people lose their lives every year because 
of armed conflicts (Ogata and Sen 2����� In some parts of 
the world, for example in some African countries, armed 
I would like to thank Konrad Hagedorn, Mar�
tina Padmanabhan, Benedikt Korf, and the two 
anonymous referees for their valuable com�
ments on the earlier versions of this paper�
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conflicts are becoming normal events and consequently the 
institutions of violence are influential in governing behavior 
and actions (Nhema 2���; Agyeman�Duah ������ 
Pastoral areas in the Horn of Africa are conflict hotspots� 
Put bluntly, these are places where states fail to properly 
fulfil their functions (Markakis 2���; Salih et al� 2����� 
One may wonder why conflicts endure despite empirical 
evidence and normative judgment telling us that they are 
destructive� Generally, conflicts occur and are sustained 
when actors realize that applying institutions of violence is 
rational in a given context (Korf 2����, but conflict�insti�
gating factors and the mechanisms of conflict vary spatially 
and temporally�
�is paper discusses the causes and consequences of con�
flicts in selected areas of Afar region, Ethiopia� �e con�
flicts addressed involve armed attacks and counterattacks 
between different pastoral groups, while the institutions of 
violence are the informal rules and norms that shape the 
behavior of individual pastoralists before, during, and after 
the events of conflict�
Section 2 introduces the study area and the data used� 
Section � outlines theoretical discussions on conflicts 
and related factors� Section � discusses the institutions of 
violence of Afar pastoralists� Section 5 explains the causes 
of conflicts between the Afar and their neighbors, while 
section � draws conclusions and makes a number of policy 
recommendations�
2. The Study Areas and the Data
Afar is one of the nine regional states of the Federal Demo�
cratic Republic of Ethiopia� Geographically, the region is 
situated between 8°��´  to ��°2�´  N and ��°5�´  to ��°2�´  E� It 
shares international borders with Eritrea (to the north� and 
Djibouti (to the northeast�� Domestically, Afar borders on 
the Somali region (to the east�, the Oromia region (to the 
south�, the Amhara region (to the west and southwest�, and 
the Tigray region (to the northwest� (Figure ��� �e region is 
arid and hot, with annual rainfall usually between 225 mm 
and 5�� mm and the daily maximum temperature between 
�8 and �5 degrees Celsius� Transhumant pastoralism is the 
main economic activity of Afar region� Afar pastoralists 
keep various types of livestock including camels, cattle, 
sheep, and goats�
�e study was conducted in two districts in the southern 
part of the region, namely, Amibara and Awash�Fentale� 
�e data was collected in two phases� �e first fieldwork 
was conducted over about six months in 2��5, involving 
extensive focused group discussions, participant observa�
tions, key informant interviews, and a household survey 
involving �2� randomly selected pastoral households� 
Discussions were also held with local administrative of�
ficials and experts working for NGOs and government 
offices� �e second fieldwork phase was conducted over  one 
month in 2��� to fill gaps in the data collected during the 
first phase� To this end several focused group discussions 
and key informant interviews were conducted� Altogether, a 
total of twelve group discussions were conducted in the two 
districts� �e analysis in this paper is based largely on the 
qualitative data generated through group discussions, key 
informant interviews, official documents of aid organiza�
tions (e�g� United Nations Emergency Unit for Ethiopia�, 
and previous studies conducted in the area (e�g� Getachew 
2���; Gebre 2����� Quantitative data (generated through the 
household survey� was used to a lesser extent�
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3. The Institutions of Violence
Many scholars of the new institutionalism regard institu�
tions as humanly designed constraints (either through 
spontaneous informal process or through formal proce�
dure� governing behavior in social and economic interac�
tions (North ����; Knight ���2; Ostrom 2��5; Schmid 
2����� Indeed, institutions facilitate the occurrence of one 
action, say A, over another, say B, by increasing the cost of 
implementing action B relative to A� While many categori�
zations are possible, institutions can be peaceful institutions 
and institutions of violence� Peaceful institutions shape the 
behavior of actors to reach an outcome through cooperation 
and harmony, whereas the institutions of violence do so 
through coercion and antagonism� �e two types of institu�
tions inherently have the potential to displace each other� 
On the one hand, peaceful institutions create an environ�
ment disabling to the institutions of violence embedded in 
conflicts, thereby facilitating peaceful interaction among 
actors�� On the other, institutions of violence can debilitate 
the capacity of existing peaceful institutions to the extent 
that the latter fail to govern behavior and action (Korf 2���; 
Korf and Fünfgeld 2����� In other words, existing regular�
ized patterns of behavior can be altered substantially and 
peaceful institutions become inoperative when the institu�
tions of violence are pre�eminent in governing behavior and 
actions�
Tigray
Amhara
Gambella
SNNPR
Oromiya Somali
Harari
Addis
Ababa
Beneshangul
Gumuz
Dire
Dava
The study area
Afar
Figure 1: Location of the study area in Afar region and Ethiopia
1 For example, the existence of strict property rights 
and effective institutions to enforce the rule of law 
can mitigate conflicts by increasing the cost of 
intrusion into territory and other unlawful actions�
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Many scholars explain the occurrence of conflicts using 
the greed�grievance conception of conflict analysis (Col�
lier and Hoeffler 2��2; de Soysa 2��2; Korf 2��5, 2���; 
Korf and Fünfgeld 2����� �e grievance hypothesis, which 
follows the neo�Malthusian line of thinking, relates the 
sustenance of institutions of violence to increasing chal-
lenges of securing access to adequate resources for survival 
(Korf and Fünfgeld 2���; Percival and Homer�Dixon ���8�� 
In this paradigm, fierce competition over natural resources 
produces inequality among resource users that, in turn, in�
duces continuous struggle (grievance� of suppressed groups 
seeking to increase their share� �e greed hypothesis, on the 
other hand, explains the sustenance of institutions of vio�
lence by focusing on opportunities that combatant groups 
can exploit by controlling spaces or resources (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2��2; de Soysa 2��2�� According to Collier and 
Hoeffler, for example, scarcity of resources may contribute 
to the incidence of conflicts but the paramount factor is 
the existence of opportunities (e�g� resources to loot� that 
combatants can exploit in situations of protracted conflicts� 
Other scholars go beyond a separate analysis of grievance 
(challenges� or greed (opportunities� to show how both can 
sustain the institutions of violence along with other factors 
(such as ideology and pride sentiments� (Cramer 2��2; Korf 
2��5, 2�����
Several empirical studies show that increasing resource 
scarcity is the main cause of conflicts in different parts of 
the world (Homer�Dixon 2���; Tir and Diehl ���8; Hauge 
and Ellingsen ���8�� Homer�Dixon argues that environ�
mental scarcities represent great challenges to human life, 
contributing to insurrections, ethnic clashes, urban unrest, 
and other forms of civil violence, especially in developing 
countries� Similarly, Bardhan argues that, while passions 
evoked by ethnocentric attitudes (i�e� pride� should not be 
overlooked, a great number of conflicts around the world 
occur as a result of increasing competition over scarce re�
sources (2��5�� Other scholars argue the role of opportuni�
ties arising from resource abundance in sustaining conflicts 
(Olsson 2���; De Boeck 2����� De Boeck discusses how 
the diamond trade across the Angolan/Congolese border 
sustains institutions of violence among actors who struggle 
to maximize their share from trade opportunities� �ese 
studies show that both challenges and opportunities can 
result in conflicts, but the two factors operate in different 
ways� When challenges appear, actors mainly target ex�
pected losses and conflicts arise when they try to minimize 
the loss unilaterally at the expense of each other� On the 
contrary, when opportunities are identified, actors mainly 
target expected benefits and conflicts arise when they try to 
maximize benefits from the opportunities by blocking one 
another�
�ese resource�centered orthodoxies have recently been 
challenged� Hagmann criticizes resource�centered argu�
ments for relying on preconceived causalities, for amalgam�
ating eco�centric and anthropocentric philosophies, and 
for neglecting the motivations and subjective perceptions 
of local actors (2��5�� Recent studies conducted within the 
context of East African pastoral areas also relativize—if 
not utterly dismiss—the link between resource scarcity 
(or abundance� and violent conflicts by focusing on newly 
introduced opportunities (e�g� access to illicit trade and the 
demand for better state benefits� and the historical process 
of modern state�building to explain conflicts (Hagmann 
and Mulugeta 2��8; Yasin 2��8; Markakis 2����� Hagmann 
and Mulugeta argue that current pastoral conflicts are com�
plex in their causes and, unlike in the past, are highly con�
nected with modern state politics and the capitalist mode 
of production� Hence, contemporary conflicts among East 
African pastoralists are driven not only by scarcity of pasto�
ral resources (which was prominent in the past� but also by 
competition over new sources of revenue (e�g� government 
budget� and control of market centers and strategic places� 
Others associate pastoral conflicts with crippled conflict 
management institutions caused by widespread corruption 
in the work of NGOs operating in these areas (Eaton 2��8� 
and politically motivated actions (Mulugeta and Hagmann 
2��8�� Taken together, these studies suggest that the causes 
of conflicts among East African pastoralists go beyond the 
pastoralists’ domain, and resource�centered solutions are 
therefore unlikely to bring sustained peace in these areas� 
4. The “Institutions of Violence” in Afar
�e institutions of violence in Afar constitute local social 
capital, which can be deployed when coercion is needed� 
Clan is the highest level where meaningful operation of 
the institutions of violence is observed since clan members 
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share common ancestors, territorial ownership, and politi�
cal leadership� �e descriptive analysis in Table � shows how 
much Afar pastoralists rely on their clan in connection with 
security�
Table 1: If you are attacked by outsiders, who will come to assist you?
Number of respondents Percent
Relatives, friends, and neighbors 5  4.5
Every clan member 106  94.6
No assistance 1  0.9
Source: Survey data
However, the level of cooperation (i�e� the level of operation 
of the institutions of violence� sometimes rises to inter�clan 
level when conflicts erupt between any Afar clan and the 
neighboring ethnic groups, as the following quote indicates:
We �Afars� fight together against outsiders �Karrayyu, Issa�� 
Our immediate neighbors belong to another tribe of Afar �the 
Weima tribe� but help us if they see us fighting with Oromo 
�Karrayyu� or Issa� We also do the same favor for them when�
ever they are attacked by others�  
(Group interview in Doho kebele, Awash Fentale district, Feb�
ruary 2��5�
�e institutions of violence are manifested in the form of 
cooperative norms before and during fighting with an en�
emy� In this regard, Afars have developed a special institu�
tion known as dero to mobilize fighters for collective action: 
when an intrusion occurs or clan members are attacked by 
outsiders those aware of the incident utter a special sound 
(“eee…”�, ensuring that many people can hear it� Others 
echo and repeat the signal until enough clan members are 
gathered for collective action� All able�bodied adult male 
members of the clan are expected to participate when the 
signal is heard� On the other hand, when an intrusion is 
planned the clan sends scouts to the target area to evaluate 
the enemy’s resources and “military” strength� �is helps 
them to decide whether to carry through the intrusion and 
to determine the number of fighters to be mobilized for col�
lective action�
Solidarity is not only expressed during collective fight�
ing and information sharing� It may take also the form of 
sharing punishments when a conflict is peacefully resolved 
through the mediation of a third party: if a subset of the 
clan is found guilty, clan members will share the penalties 
(which usually take the form of livestock�� Even in a private 
case when a clan member commits a crime against a non�
member for personal reasons, the corresponding sanction 
passes collectively to the culprit’s whole clan� Likewise, 
any incoming compensation will be shared among clan 
members� Indeed, the principle of collective (as opposed to 
individual� guilt and responsibility for infractions against 
outsiders forms the basis for solidarity within Afar clans 
and hence contributes to the effectiveness of the institutions 
of violence�
5. Explaining Conflict in Afar
�e pattern of conflict in the study areas is complex, with 
several factors contributing to the perpetuation of conflicts� 
In order to elucidate the driving forces of conflicts in the 
study areas, two cases are examined separately� �is section 
also discusses peaceful institutions (informal and formal� 
that exist to manage conflicts in the area�
5.1. Conflicts with Issa-Somali
Two major factors are making resources scarcer in Afar and 
putting many places which were previously accessible to 
Afars out of their reach� First, a wide�scale westward expan�
sion of Issa�Somalis (hereinafter Issa� in the past seven to 
eight decades has displaced a number of Afar clans (par�
ticularly those who belong to the Weima tribe� from their 
traditional rangelands in West Hararghe (Getachew 2���; 
Gebre 2�����2
Issas are in our territory� �ey get military training in Dji�
bouti to displace us from our fathers’ land� �ey were around 
Dire Dawa in the past but control most of our resources now�� 
(Interview with Seko Mohammed Seid, Afar elder at Ambash, 
Amibara district, November 2����
Similar ideas were reflected in many of the group discus�
sions� A closer look at the qualitative data reveals that Afars 
2 A tribe in this paper refers to a cluster 
of clans� Most of the Afar clans inhabit�
ing the southern part of Afar region are 
members of the Weima or Debne tribe�
3 Dire Dawa is 25�–��� km east of Aleideghi 
plain (the current key point of conflict��
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have lost control of places such as Mulu, Erer, Afdem, and 
part of the Alaydeghi plain�
Second, state development programs have increased the 
pressure on the Afars� A total of ��5,2�� hectares of prime 
Afar rangeland has been confiscated by the Ethiopian state 
for various purposes (Table 2�� �e Yangudirassa National 
Park, Alaydeghi Wildlife Reserve, West Awash Wildlife 
Reserve, Gewane Wildlife Reserve, Mille Serdo Wildlife 
Reserve, West Awash Controlled Hunting Area, and several 
large�scale farms in the Middle Awash Valley constrict the 
Afars’ access to rangeland resources�
Table 2: Land confiscated from Afar pastoralists 
Purpose Area (ha)
National parks  54,870
Wildlife reserves 148,180
Controlled hunting areas 150,680
Commercial farms  16,318
Other   2,160
Total 372,208
Source: Computed from Yemane (2003, 5), Getachew (2001, 91), and own data
Squeezed from different directions, the Afars became ag�
gressively resistant against the Issas, which led to recurrent 
bloodshed between the two ethnic groups� More important�
ly, the rapid and coercive westward expansion of the Issa 
into territories historically controlled by Afars has reduced 
the possibility of peaceful resource sharing among the two 
groups� Alaydeghi, Blen, Buri and Andido are the major 
places of conflict with Issa pastoralists because of their bet�
ter endowment of pastoral resources� �e conflict is exacer�
bated by the prolonged and recurrent droughts the area has 
experienced, particularly, since the mid�����s� For instance, 
a series of clashes occurred between the two groups in 2��2 
following the failure of the sugum rain that normally occurs 
in March and April (UN�EUE 2��2a, 2��2b; Markakis 
2����� �e conflict during that time was quite serious and 
reached to the extent of blocking transportation between 
Ethiopia and Djibouti for some time�
While the shrinking pastoral resource base is an important 
factor in explaining the Afar�Issa conflict, it is not the only 
one� Smuggling has also contributed much to the perpetu�
ation of the conflict� Apart from its grazing resources, 
the eastern part of Afar is a smuggling route for caravans 
taking large quantities of manufactured goods (clothing, 
footwear, electronics, pharmaceuticals� and food from the 
eastern borderlands of Ethiopia to Addis Ababa� For a long 
time the Afar have benefited from their strategic location 
on this trade route by acting as middlemen between the 
coastal and hinterland traders as well as by direct involve�
ment in the smuggling business (Getachew 2����� However, 
the Afars’ gains from smuggling have attracted Issas who 
are also active in this field� Issas control two key smuggling 
centers (Gedamaitu and Adaitu� in the Afars’ contested 
territory whereas Afars frequently inflict attacks on Issa to 
regain these strategic places� For instance, a series of clashes 
between the two groups over control of the trading centers 
were recorded in 2��� and 2��2 (UN�EUE 2���; 2��2a�� For 
Issas, controlling the trading centers ensures free movement 
to transport smuggled goods between Ethiopia’s two main 
import�export lines, the railway and the highway� For Afars, 
maintaining control over such strategic places not only 
ensures their income from the “underground economy” 
but also relaxes their access to grazing resources especially 
during drought years� �erefore, for both groups, fight�
ing is in this case mainly a matter of expanding their own 
“free zone” to maximize benefits from cross�border trade 
opportunities�
Another source of conflict between the two groups is the 
recurring livestock raiding� Issas not only fight for the rich 
pastoral resources and of smuggling centers in Afar terri�
tory, but also for the livestock that they can raid from Afars 
to sell immediately in domestic markets or export through 
illegal routes� Nor are Afars immune from the raiding “busi�
ness�” Notable examples of livestock raids and counter�raids 
occurred in 2��2: In June 2��2, Issas raided more than �,5�� 
head of livestock from Afar and killed seven Afar herders� 
Organizing in response, the Afars went to Mulu market to 
save their animals from being sold, but were unsuccessful 
as the animals were taken to Djibouti by a different route� 
Four months later, young Afar men took retaliation against 
the Issa and sold a number of raided animals (the number 
not reported� at Bati market in Amhara region� �is implies 
that livestock raiding between the two groups is a reciprocal 
“business” that sustains conflicts between them�
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Meanwhile the conflict between Afar and Issa has be�
come highly politicized, particularly since the ����s� �e 
military�led regime that overthrew a civilian government 
in ���� showed a strong demand for territorial expansion 
to form “the Great Somalia,” which was the main cause 
of war between Ethiopia and Somalia in ����/�8� �is 
pan�Somali passion of the former Somali regime and its 
military support led the Issas—as ethnic Somalis—to claim 
several places in Afar including the flood�fed rangelands in 
the Middle Awash Valley (Getachew 2���; Markakis 2���; 
Galaty and Bonte ������ Although the pan�Somali passion 
is not formally promoted nowadays, the legacy of the past 
regime still influences the attitudes of Afars towards the 
Issas� Indeed, there is a strong belief among ordinary Afars 
that any attack they launch on Issa is legitimate as long as 
Issas are in their traditional territory� Moreover, the con�
flict between the two is compounded by current political 
situations and complexities in the Horn� �e ethnic�based 
federalism adopted in Ethiopia in ���� which increased 
ethnic groups’ awareness of traditional territories, the un�
stable geopolitical conditions of the Horn countries which 
facilitated illegal trafficking of firearms, and the high 
dependence of Ethiopia on the port of Djibouti where the 
Issas have political dominance over Afars are all contribut�
ing to the perpetuation of conflicts between the two ethnic 
groups�
5.2. Conflicts with Karrayyu-Oromo
�e Karrayyu are longtime neighbors of the Afar� �eir 
relationship began two centuries ago when Karrayyus 
occupied the Upper and Middle Awash Valley (Getachew 
2���; Gebre 2����� Traditionally, Afars control areas north 
of Mount Fentale whereas Karrayyus control the lands to 
the south� �e two groups had strong economic and social 
relationships in the past, which were also manifested in 
solidarity and shared values� As Getachew notes: “�ey 
shared pastures and even lived in shared settlements” (2���, 
�8�� While such positive relationships still exist to some 
extent, their conflictive interactions are more pronounced 
nowadays�
Two main reasons can be given for gradual deterioration 
of peaceful interaction between Afars and Karrayyus� �e 
first is the gradual decline of the pastoral resource base for 
various reasons� Confiscation of land by the state is among 
the serious challenges that Afars in Awash�Fentale have 
been facing since the ����s� Near Mount Fentale, the Awara 
Melka state farm now occupies a significant tract of the 
rangeland previously accessible to Afars, while several state 
farms (such as Melka�Sedi, Melka�Werer, and Yalo� and set�
tlement farms occupy large tracts of the dry season grazing 
retreat in Amibara� Most of the remaining rangelands have 
also been proclaimed as game reserves, national parks, and 
controlled hunting areas (Table 2�� In addition to state land 
confiscation schemes, the westward expansion of the Issa 
displaced several Afar clans from their homelands in West 
Hararghe (Gebre 2���; Getachew 2����� �e declining re�
source base within their territory pushed Afars southwards 
and increased their competition with Karrayyus� However, 
resource scarcity is not unique to Afars� Karrayyus are also 
victims of the extensive land confiscation programs of the 
Ethiopian state� �e Nura Era Orchard, the Metehara Sugar 
Estate, and part of the Awash National Park have already 
displaced Karrayyus from their rangelands (Gebre 2���; 
Tolera 2����� Moreover, Karrayyus face continuous pres�
sure in the east from Arsi Oromos (Getachew 2���; Tolera 
2����� �e severity of resource scarcity has been worsened 
by a series of droughts since mid�����s, and the deteriora�
tion of rangeland quality over time due to expansions of 
unwanted plants (such as Acacia nubica and Acacia senegal� 
(Abule et al� 2��5, 2��� 
�e deterioration in the pastoral resource base has nega�
tively influenced peaceful relations between the two groups� 
On the one hand, Karrayyus become less willing to permit 
Afar herders onto rangelands in their domain and less toler�
ant to any intrusion (Gebre 2����� On the other hand, such 
resource scarcity also leads Karrayyus to cross into Afar 
territory, resulting in frequent confrontations between the 
two groups� �e Karrayyus’ conflict is more serious with 
the Weima tribe of Afar because the latter settled near con�
tested areas following their eviction from West Hararghe by 
Issa� Frequent clashes occur between the Weima Afar and 
Karrayyu, particularly near the Awash National Park (in 
places such as Beleadi, Aroretti, and Dinkuku Pond� and 
around Mount Gumbi� Conflicts occasionally also erupt 
between Karrayyus and the Debne tribe of Afar (longtime 
neighbors of the Karrayyu� over the wet�season rangeland 
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known as the Gababa plain (between the two peaks of 
Mount Fentale�� Clashes are more intense during droughts� 
For instance, a series of attacks and counter�attacks be�
tween Afar and Karrayyu occurred in June 2��2 following 
the failure of the short rainy season (UN�EUE 2��2a�� �e 
conflict became exacerbated later in October as the drought 
continued (UN�EUE 2��2b��
Another cause of the Afar�Karrayyu conflict is the intensi�
fication of livestock raiding (gadle) between the two groups� 
Indeed, raiding is the traditional phenomenon between the 
two groups, and is tacitly approved by traditional lead�
ers (Getachew 2����� In its traditional sense, raiding is a 
means of restocking after drought seasons, establishing 
initial stock for young men in order to assert manhood in 
the pastoral environment, and increasing prestige� Nowa�
days, however, livestock are mainly raided for commercial 
purposes and sold in open markets or exported through 
illegal routes� Since contemporary raids are usually wide in 
scale of operation, the level of conflict sometimes reaches an 
extent where government security forces have to intervene� 
For instance, in 2���, Karrayyus raided some five hundred 
head of livestock from Afar in Awash�Fentale, killing five 
Afar herders and injuring one� On a revenge attack, the 
Afars killed one Karrayyu and raided an unknown number 
of animals� �e spiraling escalation of conflict was stopped 
by the intervention of the government�
5.3. Comparative Discussion
At least two important factors can be extracted from the 
above discussions� First, state land confiscation programs 
since the ����s have increased resource scarcity in the study 
areas and aggravated conflict� Since large state�owned es�
tablishments—nature reserves and large�scale farms—have 
occupied most of the dry�season rangelands (kalo), pasto�
ralists have been forced to keep their livestock in wet�season 
rangelands (alta) almost year�round� �is has increased the 
scope for confrontation with neighboring ethnic groups 
(such as Issa and Karrayyu� since most of the wet�season 
rangelands (e�g� the Alaydeghi plain and the Fentale� are 
found in contested zones� �is policy�induced scarcity is 
exacerbated by the recurrence of drought in the study areas� 
Given that pastoral resources are subtractable in nature, 
scarcity implies the existence of highly negative appropria�
tion externalities�� In such situations, each pastoral group 
seeks to minimize and if possible avoid the negative exter�
nalities created by others� �is is outlined by an Afar elder:
We fight with others during droughts because water and 
grasses are not adequate to feed our animals� When we migrate 
elsewhere beyond our territory we usually negotiate with the 
owners �except with Issa� to feed our animals; most likely, the 
owners refuse to allow more animals onto their rangeland dur�
ing droughts� However, refusal by the owners does not block us 
from entering the desired rangeland because we have to save our 
animals from possible death�  
(Interview with Hummed Musa, Afar elder in Amibara, Febru�
ary 2��5�
�is means that resource scarcity (induced by policy and 
nature� has transformed a cooperative game of using pas�
toral resources into a zero�sum game in which the gains of 
the gainers are equal to the losses of the losers and hence 
has facilitated the application of the institutions of violence�
�e second conflict�instigating factor is livestock raiding� 
Livestock are resources that can be accumulated through 
production (by applying peaceful institutions� or through 
raiding (by applying the institutions of violence� by Afars 
and their neighbors� As a “forced contract,” livestock raiding 
has traditionally occurred between pastoral groups of East 
Africa since time immemorial (Galaty and Bonte ����; Otim 
2��2�� While raiding, as a cultural phenomenon, contributes 
to conflicts in the study areas, culture provides a partial 
explanation for the existence of raiding� Nowadays, raiding 
occurs not only for cultural reasons but also to earn income 
by selling the animals in open markets� �is is due to the 
integration of the pastoral economy into the commercial 
economy, which is associated with increasing access to 
external and domestic livestock markets� �e change in the 
incentive for livestock raiding from “culture” to “commerce” 
arising from the opportunity to sell the raided animals 
could influence the frequency and extent of conflicts� First, 
4 �e negative externalities are manifested in 
the costs incurred to fulfill the biological needs 
of livestock (i�e� resource appropriation costs��
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commercial raiding is extensive in nature, which means that 
it is less tolerable and hence the victims are more likely to 
take retaliatory action� Second, by its nature, commercial 
raiding involves larger numbers of actors� Livestock traders, 
traffickers of illegal arms, and others are usually behind the 
raids, fueling up the conflicts� Since these actors share few 
common norms and values, traditional institutions are less 
effective in managing conflicts associated with commercial 
raiding� �ird, commercial raiding increases the likelihood 
that raided animals will quickly be beyond the reach of the 
raided groups, which reduces the effectiveness of negotia�
tions to return the animals� As local opinions indicate, there 
are several cases in which negotiations were unable to bring 
any change simply because the animals had crossed the 
border to Djibouti or Somalia or been marketed elsewhere 
within Ethiopia� �e usual response of a victim group is 
retaliation using its institutions of violence�
An implicit factor behind the conflicts is access to conflict 
technologies, which is mainly associated with the instability 
in the Horn of Africa since the ����s�5 In the “old” days, con�
flict technologies constituted traditional fighting tools� Local 
accounts indicate that Afars (and their neighbors� used to 
fight with spears, bows, swords, and, in rare cases, non�auto�
matic rifles� Nowadays, if these old conflict technologies ex�
ist at all, it is only for their symbolic value� Instead, modern 
firearms are used to attack and defend� It is not surprising to 
encounter armed youths around homesteads, in bush areas, 
and in some towns in Afar� �is is not without reason� Bet�
ter access to conflict technologies increases win probabilities 
and hence increase the likelihood of controlling strategic 
places or benefiting from looted resources (livestock�� 
Indeed, it is an imperative for every Afar to acquire modern 
weapons to sustain their livelihood, given that the neighbor�
ing groups own and use the same technologies� �is implies 
that, as power resources, modern conflict technologies are 
essential instruments that sustain the institutions of violence 
among Afars and their neighbors�
5.4. Institutional Aspects
�e likelihood of violent conflicts will be zero—at least 
theoretically—if peaceful institutions exist to counterbal�
ance the institutions of violence� �is subsection discusses 
the capacity and effectiveness of the existing institutions to 
counteract the institutions of violence� Since such institu�
tions can be formal or informal, the two categories are 
discussed separately�
5.4.1. Informal Conflict Management Institutions
Conflicts between Afar clans are managed by the madaa 
based on Afar customary law� Members of the traditional 
jury are elders selected from different clans, excluding the 
clans involved in dispute� �e process is called billi arri, 
which literally means peace�making� In the mediation 
process, the mediators focus on cooling off the parties by 
extending the length of the procedure until they settle their 
affairs by themselves� According to the elders in Ambash, 
traditional deliberations may take up to two weeks� Sanc�
tions are not designed to punish the wrongdoer� Instead, to 
use Rugege’s expressions, the traditional mediators impose 
sanctions based more on the “give�little�and�take�little” 
principle than the “winner�takes�all” principle (���5�� 
�e madaa has the authority and legitimacy to effectively 
enforce sanctions imposed by the traditional jury� Central 
to its effectiveness is the tradition of forgiveness among 
Afar clans, respect for elders, and the transfer of resources 
as compensation� As a result, there are few cases in which 
conflicts between Afar clans escalate until they need the 
mediation of outsiders� 
�e madaa was able to effectively manage conflicts 
between Afars and some of their neighbors in the past 
(Getachew 2����� For example, Afar and Karrayyu used 
to share institutions that enable them to exchange fugi�
tives, pay compensation, and reduce tensions; i�e� if an 
Afar murdered a Karrayyu (or vice versa�, a traditional 
jury composed of both ethnic groups would handle the 
5 Countries in the Horn of Africa have been 
shaken by war and civil unrest particularly since 
the ����s� �e Ethio�Somalia war of the ����s, the 
civil war in Somalia since the ��8�s, the instabil�
ity in Djibouti in ����s, the intensified civil war 
in Ethiopia in the ��8�s and early ����s, and 
the Ethio�Eritrea war in the late ����s are apt 
examples� �ese instabilities and wars facili�
tated the availability of light weapons in “under�
ground” markets of all countries in the Horn�
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case�� However, though they still exist to some extent, 
these shared institutions are no longer influential� For 
Afar and Issa, the traditional framework for managing 
conflicts (as well enforcing agreements� is either latent or 
non�existent� In general, the madaa is now less effective 
at managing inter�ethnic conflicts�
�e household survey also indicates that inter�clan conflicts 
are within the capacity of traditional institutions while 
inter�ethnic conflicts often exceed it� �irty�eight out of 
forty�eight interviewed pastoralists who reported inter�
ethnic conflicts indicated that the conflicts were either 
resolved with the involvement of formal mediators or were 
not resolved at all� �is contrasts with inter�clan conflicts, 
which required little external facilitation within the period 
considered�
5.4.2. Formal Conflict Management Institutions
�e existence of well�functioning formal institutions (in 
addition to informal ones� may have two related benefits for 
societies (Knight ���2�� First, the existence of formal institu�
tions facilitates the introduction of third�party enforcers 
(mainly the state� and can help to stabilize informal institu�
tions� Second, the introduction of formal institutions makes 
the institutional setup more complete and robust for han�
dling diverse challenges and opportunities� In this respect, 
state�backed property rights and conflict management 
institutions can augment informal institutions in managing 
conflicts in pastoral areas (Swallow and Bromley ���5��
As a third�party rule enforcer, the state is expected to facili�
tate peaceful interaction between right�holders and duty�
bearers� However, this is not the case in the study areas: 
the right�holders and the duty�bearers are often unknown, 
particularly in border areas� Meanwhile, high territorial 
demand is observed particularly for locations that have 
either better pastoral resources (such as the Alaydeghi plain 
and the vicinity of Mount Fentale� or strategic importance 
for exploiting trade opportunities (such as Gedamaitu and 
Adaitu�� Afars move into contested areas without the con�
sent of their neighbors because they believe that these areas 
are within their territorial domain� �eir neighbors also do 
not hesitate to take countervailing actions that usually lead 
to bloody confrontations� �e actions of the local adminis�
trations are limited to precautionary tactics such as estab�
lishing offices in contested areas to safeguard future claims 
of their people�� At higher levels, conflicts are understated 
and are usually considered as temporary conflicts over 
pasture and water rather than a struggle between groups for 
permanent territorial control�
In several policy documents the Ethiopian government 
has acknowledged the complexity of pastoral challenges 
and called for certain critical interventions to improve the 
livelihoods of pastoral communities� However, conflict 
and its management have received marginal attention, if 
mentioned at all, in many of the contemporary policy docu�
ments� For instance, while eight articles (out of ���� in the 
food security strategy of ���� discuss pastoral areas, none of 
them mentions the importance of conflict management in 
these areas (FDRE ������ Even the most recent policy docu�
ment, the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduc�
tion Program, envisages no systematic way of managing 
conflicts in pastoral areas (FDRE 2��2�� 
Despite this fact, government and development agencies 
intervene in conflict mediations on an ad hoc basis� Actu�
ally, most of the inter�ethnic conflicts within three years 
preceding this study were mediated in the presence of the 
government and the NGOs operating in the area (such as 
CARE Ethiopia�� �e mediation forums were held in urban 
centers in the presence of traditional leaders and govern�
ment officials, where the latter took leadership on the stage� 
�e meetings lasted two to three days depending upon the 
complexity of the cases and the damages involved� �e 
government and the NGOs provided logistics to bring the 
conflicting parties together�
6 Based on the rule that the culprit and his 
clan pay ��� head of cattle as compensation or 
blood money to the victim’s family and clan�
7 In order to stop the expansion of the Issa, new dis�
trict offices have been built close to the eastern border 
of Afar region� Since October 2���, the Amibara 
district administration has transferred all district�
level government offices to an open rangeland known 
as Andido, which is a critical penetration point of the 
Issa because of its proximity to water points at Blen�
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Unfortunately, these mediation efforts were unable to 
mitigate the recurrent conflicts between Afars and their 
neighbors� Rather, formal mediations are usually wound 
up with pseudo�commitments by participants to share 
resources in a peaceful manner� For instance, at the formal 
mediation forums in the towns of Awash � Kilo and Dire 
Dawa in December ���8, Afar and Issa elders agreed to 
forgive each other for earlier conflicts and vowed to work 
together for peace and stability of the area (Unruh 2��5�� 
However, the conflicts between the two groups showed 
no sign of abating after these promising agreements, with 
instances of conflict between the two groups occurring 
in June 2��2 (UN�EUE 2��2a�, October 2��2 (UN�EUE 
2��2b�, and April 2��� (“MoWR Alaydege Conflict Delay,” 
Addis Fortune, April 2�, 2���� offering typical justifica�
tions for the violations of prior agreements� Similarly, more 
than five instances of conflict between Afar and Karrayyu 
occurred in 2��� despite the efforts of the government and 
NGOs to mediate between the two groups� �e recurrent 
failures of formal mediations to bring harmony among 
conflicting groups have reduced confidence among Afars� 
As a result, Afars have termed formal mediations dir wegry, 
which literally means false mediations�
A number of limitations are embedded in formal media�
tions� �e first is that local mediators may lack knowledge 
and experience on how to apply the informal and the 
formal approaches in an integrated manner� �is may 
create disparities between the local elders and government 
officials in their ways of handling the mediation� In the 
traditional system, mediators rarely act as a dictating party 
but use “soft” techniques to resolve conflicts� By contrast, 
formal mediators usually downplay the “soft” techniques 
of traditional mediators and are tempted to provide fast 
solutions�
Second, formal mediation forums are organized with 
budget support from the government and the NGOs op�
erating in the area and conducted in high�profile hotels in 
local towns (such as Awash � Kilo� with traditional elders 
compensated for their participation entirely in monetary 
terms (in the form of per diems and transport allowances�� 
�e facilitators (affiliated with government offices and 
NGOs� also take their share of benefits by claiming for per 
diems and allowances� Since the budget rules for conflict 
mediation do not follow the standard procedures of public 
finance, it is highly likely that the compensation paid to the 
mediating actors is inflated and the budget is corrupted� 
�is implies, as also observed elsewhere in East Africa 
(Eaton 2��8�, that conflicts between Afar pastoralists and 
their neighbors could serve as a “business opportunity” for 
mediating actors thereby reducing the incentive of these 
actors to work for total avoidance of violence�
�e third problem of formal mediation emanates from 
the domination of local officials in the mediation pro�
cess� Some local opinion holds that government officials 
monopolize the mediation forum and elders are given 
little chance to express their views or else their interests 
are overlooked� Moreover, since participation of the elders 
in the mediation forums provide them with the opportu�
nity to access state and NGO budgets and participants are 
often selected by local politicians, elders tend to “stay on 
the safe side” in the mediation process� �e involvement 
of local elders in this way can have detrimental effects 
on traditional institutions and sustainability of peaceful 
interactions among the neighboring groups� �at is to 
say, the elders, who could provide an alternative forum 
for justice, may be associated with the formal authority by 
the local people and lose their legitimacy, as also observed 
elsewhere in East Africa (Hoehne 2���; Mulugeta and 
Hagmann 2��8�� For instance, Mulugeta and Hagmann 
note that traditional Karrayyu elders have earned the 
nickname luke, meaning informer, because of their loyalty 
to politicians�
6. Conclusion and Policy Suggestions
�e institutions of violence are frequently on the front line 
when it comes to influencing behavior and action among 
the interacting groups in Afar� In line with contemporary 
arguments (Homer�Dixon ���8; 2���; Tir and Diehl ���8; 
Hauge and Ellingsen ���8�, the findings show that resource 
scarcity is an important challenge leading to recurrent 
clashes among neighboring groups� Extensive land confis�
cations by the state and recurrent droughts are the major 
factors contributing to resource scarcity� However, resource 
scarcity is not the only factor that led to conflicts in the 
study areas� Livelihood opportunities have also played some 
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role� In this regard, market opportunities for livestock (both 
domestic and abroad�, opportunities for smuggling, and ac�
cess to modern conflict technologies are important�
Conflict management should be recognized as part and par�
cel of pastoral development policies, because development 
efforts cannot produce the anticipated impacts on the liveli�
hood of pastoralists in the presence of recurrent conflicts in 
pastoral areas� While managing conflicts in pastoral areas 
should be a crucial policy agenda, it is worthwhile, however, 
to recognize that conflicts in the study areas are complex 
and diverse in origin� �erefore, a detailed understanding 
of the natural, social, economic, political, and historical 
contexts of pastoral areas is crucial to providing long�last�
ing solutions�
�e current situation indicates that traditional institutions 
alone are not effective in managing conflicts and hence 
external intervention is indispensable� �is is attributable to 
the gradual weakening of the ability of traditional institu�
tions to manage resource use patterns and to the fact that 
some of the contemporary causes of conflicts are beyond 
the capacity of traditional authorities� It is worthwhile to 
note, however, that external intervention does not mean 
introducing entirely new forms of governance and crafting 
“modern” rules to extinguish the traditional ones� Rather, 
it is essential to provide a locally motivated institutional 
framework whereby traditional and formal conflict man�
agement institutions cross�fertilize each other� In this 
regard, the government should strengthen out�of�court 
conflict management procedures by building the capacities 
of local and traditional authorities, for example through 
regular training events where innovative new procedures 
and successful experiences from other areas are intro�
duced� In the meantime, it is important to strengthen legal 
institutions at district level so that the conflicting parties 
can present their cases for judgment when mediations fail� 
In the long run this latter point implies strengthening state 
security institutions step by step to realize fully functioning 
rule of law in pastoral areas�
Finally, managing inter�ethnic conflicts requires strong 
cooperation between neighboring regions (Afar, Somali, 
and Oromia�, including designing institutions to sanction 
cross�regional livestock raiding and facilitating inter�ethnic 
resource�sharing� However, mitigating conflicts in these 
areas entails also cooperation beyond the neighboring 
regions� In this regard, creating strong alliances among 
neighboring countries (e�g� Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Somalil�
and� to control illicit cross�border trade and small arms 
trafficking, to license and facilitate cross�border livestock 
trade, and to exchange cross�border livestock raiders and 
criminals is an essential, albeit challenging, element of 
conflict management�
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